Constitution Association v. Harris (featuring National Federation of Republican Assemblies)

INTRODUCTION

In December of 2020, a lawsuit was filed claiming that Kamala Harris is not constitutionally eligible for the role of the vice president. This was filed by a group called the "Constitution Association" which appears to be a conservative group that teaches their interpretation of the US Constitution.

The lawsuit itself seems to have gone nowhere, judging by this site or this site (which lists updates about cases and such). It appears to have been dismissed in 2021, with a subsequent at appeal going nowhere. From what I can gather, it seems it was dismissed on standing grounds (saying the plaintiffs hadn't suffered a concrete enough injury to bring a lawsuit), and thus the merits (arguments) were not ruled upon.

This blog post was originally written back when the lawsuit was originally filed, before any dismissal. At the time, I looked over the lawsuit's arguments and was surprised by some of the major and obvious errors in it. However, as the lawsuit ended up not going anywhere, this (as is the case with many other prospective posts) simply languished in the "Draft" category of my blog. And it probably would have stayed that way, if not for the fact there was some minor news about how a group called the National Federation of Republican Assemblies (NFRA for short) put in their platform about how Kamala Harris (along with at-the-time Republican candidates for president Vivek Ramaswamy and Nikki Haley) were ineligible. The platform was short and a bit vague, but I noticed the cases it was citing were ones that this lawsuit also cited, and therefore was presumably making the same errors.

The purpose of this post isn't to make a full-on argument towards a more broad view of the natural-born citizenship requirement for president, but rather respond to the specific claims that are being made by the NFRA and the lawsuit in question. Should one want to see a more general argument on the subject, and from an originalist perspective at that, see the law review article "The Original Meaning of 'Natural Born'" by Michael D. Ramsey, available here. (the same author has an article on the subject of the original meaning of birthright citizenship in general here).

As is often the case with my responses or rebuttals or critiques, someone might wonder why I'm posting this so long after the lawsuit is even relevant. After all, it was dismissed anyway.  Even the NFRA story broke a few months ago and thus this is out of date even for that; heck, the whole thing seems to have been rendered moot at this point by the fact Harris lost the 2024 election. Well, I had written most of what you will see prior to its dismissal, and since it's not doing anything sitting in the draft folder, and because the issue has become somewhat relevant again, I thought I might as well post it. Maybe someone can get something out of it. It's never a complete waste of time to correct error, after all. So I went in, updated my original draft, and here it is.

This essay will begin with the lawsuit and then at the end turn to the NFRA platform. The lawsuit analysis was mostly written back in 2020, but I have updated and refined various parts in preparation for this publication. Of course, given my general slowness, this is ending up going up months even after the NFRA story broke. In regards to the lawsuit, I will admit I am not in any respect a lawyer, just someone with interest in law. But some of the errors in this lawsuit are so big and so obvious that it speaks poorly to any lawyer who brought it.

This is going to be a long post, so if anyone wants to just see the summary, skip down to the "Conclusion" section towards the end.

Note that unless otherwise specified, one can assume that any bolding or emphasis in the various quotations I offer from the lawsuit or other sources is their own.

EXAMINATION OF THE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION'S LAWSUIT

Someone may "follow along" the arguments of the lawsuit here. (there is also one on the site of the "Constitution Association" itself) I am not going to address every single thing in the lawsuit, but will cover the main points.

For a while it's just preparatory material there is little to discuss about; there are some points to possibly take issue with, but as they are not the main issues with the lawsuit, they will be passed over.

We finally get to the important parts with #45, though comments on that will be reserved until later, when they become more relevant. So we start properly at #46 where it notes that "natural born citizen" seems to have been derived from the English term "natural born subject". The fact they acknowledge a connection is made clear by what they say in #47:

Robert G. Natelson, a constitutional scholar, in his publication The Original Constitution; What it Said and Meant held that:

"We know exactly what the founders meant by the Phrase "natural born citizen" because they adapted it from the English term "natural born subject"; which in Britain defined who could serve in Parliament or The Privy Council." 

This does not tell us what page of this work this is from, though I was able to find it on page 127. Before we get to what it says, though, is it not rather odd that it quotes Natelson as saying that they know exactly what the founders meant by the phrase, but the lawsuit does not quote further as to Natelson's conclusions? If his conclusions are in agreement with the lawsuit, why not quote them to bring in a scholar to back them up? If his conclusions are not in agreement with the lawsuit, then it seems dishonest to quote him like this.

And it turns out it is the latter, and Natelson's conclusions go against the lawsuit. Here is Natelson's statement in full paragraph, with my emphasis added:

"Most importantly, the President and Vice President had to be natural-born citizens or citizens at the time of ratification. We know exactly what the Founders meant by the phrase "natural born citizen" because they adapted it from the English legal term, "natural born subject," which in Britain defined who could serve in Parliament or the Privy Council. Essentially, a natural born citizen was one who met either of the two requirements. First, a person qualified if born within the United States or within American territory, even if the person's parents were aliens. Alternatively, an individual qualified even if born outside the country if the individual's father was an American citizen not then engaged in traitorous or felonious activities."

The work being cited explicitly contradicts the lawsuit! Even worse, it does so immediately after the quote given.

How can one cite something as evidence and not notice that immediately after the quote, it goes against them? There are only three possibilities I can see for the lawsuit citing Natelson despite Natelson going explicitly against the lawsuit's claims. Namely, that the lawsuit's author(s):
1) Were so excited to see the phrase "we know exactly what the Founders meant" that they stopped after that sentence and didn't read the next one.
2) Deliberately omitted this information by deceit.
3) Just saw this quote provided by someone else who had committed #1 or #2, and the lawsuit's writers decided to make use of it without verifying it.

If I had to guess, I would say #3 is the most likely, but all of them are bad and cast doubt on the competence and/or honesty of the lawsuit writers.

Now, I should take a bit of an aside to discuss natural born subject in more detail. And this is where the lawsuit encounters a major problem. William Blackstone says in his work "Commentaries on the Laws of England", Book 1 Chapter 10:

"The first and most obvious division of the people is into aliens and natural-born subjects. Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the dominions of the crown of England, that is, within the ligeance, or as it is generally called, the allegiance of the king; and aliens, such as are born out of it."

He also says later in the same chapter:

"The children of aliens, born here in England, are, generally speaking, natural-born subjects, and entitled to all the privileges of such. In which the constitution of France differs from ours; for there, by their jus albinatus, if a child be born of foreign parents, it is an alien."

While our interest in this post is primarily that of people born within the United States (regardless of their parentage), it should be mentioned that Blackstone notes the existence of laws passed by parliament that allowed people born outside of English territory to be natural born subjects under certain circumstances. Shorty before the above quotation, Blackstone says:

"Yet the children of the king's embassadors born abroad were always held to be natural subjects: for as the father, though in a foreign country, owes not even a local allegiance to the prince to whom he is sent; so, with regard to the son also, he was held (by a kind of postliminium) to be born under the king of England's allegiance, represented by his father, the embassador. To encourage also foreign commerce, it was enacted by statute 25 Edw. III. st. 2. that all children born abroad, provided both their parents were at the time of the birth in allegiance to the king, and the mother had passed the seas by her husband's consent, might inherit as if born in England: and accordingly it hath been so adjudged in behalf of merchants. But by several more modern statutes these restrictions are still farther taken off: so that all children, born out of the king’s ligeance, whose fathers were natural-born subjects, are now natural-born subjects themselves, to all intents and purposes, without any exceptions; unless their said fathers were attained, or banished beyond sea, for high treason; or were then in the service of a prince at enmity with Great Britain."

After noting that ambassadors (apparently spelled embassadors back then) are a special case where their children are automatically natural born subjects due to not even having a local allegiance to anyone else, he mentions how parliament has passed laws to make natural born subjects out of more regular people born outside of the king's territories, so long as certain requirements were met. Originally it required both parents to be natural born subjects, then changed to require only their father to be natural born subjects... and it should be noted that in between the publication of this work and the framing of the US Constitution, the British had made it more generous still, requiring someone to only have a grandfather who was a natural born citizen.

The summary of this is that, as understood by Blackstone, a natural born subject is anyone born within the territories of the British king even if their parents are not citizens (with a few exceptions like children of ambassadors due to them not possessing any allegiance to the king--his mention of ambassadors is in reference to British ambassadors in foreign lands but implicitly applies the opposite way), and Parliament by law can make people born even in foreign lands natural born subjects.

Why all this focus on Blackstone? Because Blackstone's Commentaries, which were a summary of the common law of England, were extremely influential and there is essentially no doubt that those involved in putting together the Constitution, particularly those who had legal training (and quite a few did), would have been very familiar with it. If natural born citizen comes from natural born subject, then it is only proper that we map the definition onto it. Natural born subjects are those born within the dominions of the king, even if they are children of aliens (nowadays "alien" is used to refer to extraterrestrial life, but back then was the standard term for someone from another country). Mapping this onto the United States, it would mean natural-born citizens are those born within the United States, even if they are children of aliens (one exception of necessity would be children of slaves). Note also that Blackstone mentions that France operates differently, where it is decided entirely by the parentage.

Astonishingly, despite the lawsuit admitting that it comes from "Natural born subject", these extraordinarily important remarks from Blackstone are completely ignored! I understand that the purpose of this lawsuit is to argue for their side and any counter-responses could be responded to if the other side brought them up, but Blackstone is such a major argument against their position that it is incredible they will not address it. Especially given they were the ones who brought up the "natural born subject" idea to begin with and said that natural born citizen comes from it!

It is simply incredible to see the fact they agree that natural born citizen comes from natural born subject, but are apparently unaware of how major a blow this is to their own position. Natural born citizen coming from natural born subject is the argument made by people who take an expansive view of the term natural born citizen. This is not the last time the lawsuit will cite something, apparently completely unaware that what they just cited actually is a major point against their position (e.g. see their later invocation of Wong Kim Ark).

#51 and #52 are attempts to show the influence of Emmer de Vattel's work "The Law of Nations". There are two problems with this. The first is that while this certainly had some influence on how the founders thought about international law, there is a paucity of evidence that it informed their thoughts on citizenship. Furthermore, appealing to Vattel for the meaning of natural born citizen has a major issue which will be discussed next. At #53, it is claimed:

Before the Constitution was written, the most contemporaneous historical reference we have to the meaning of "natural born Citizen" is from a three volume political treatise on Natural Law and the establishment of republican government that was well-known and beloved by the Framers of the Constitution, which was written by Emmerich de Vattel.  

The argument of the lawsuit leans very heavily on this claim, but as we'll see, it does so wrongfully. But before we get to that, let's summarize the argument. According to the lawsuit, Vattel used the term "Natural born citizen" and because the writers of the Constitution were influenced by Vattel, we should accept Vattel's definition as that being what the Constitution had in mind. The lawsuit even goes so far later on (at #80) as to claim that Vattel was the one who came up with the term ("The United States is only the second such example in the world to establish the definition of the natural born concept which is found only in Vattel, who gave it the name: Natural Born Citizen."). At #54 they pull out the "money quote" so to speak:

54. The Law of Nations was written by Emmerich de Vattel, a Swiss-German philosopher of law. In that book, the following definition of a 'natural born citizen' appears, in Book I, Chapter 19, § 212, of the English translation of 1797 (p. 110): 

"§ 212. Citizens and natives.

The citizens are the members of the civil society: bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. As the society cannot exist and perpetuate itself otherwise than by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights." (emphasis added)

One may read the copy being quoted here. They got the page number wrong; it is page 101, not 110. Either this is a typo, or they just copied this off of someplace else without bothering to verify it. However, aside from the page number being wrong, I would like the reader to carefully look at what the lawsuit just claimed and see if they can spot the major problem that, incredibly, appears to have been missed by the lawsuit's author(s).

Have you noticed it? If not, I'll tell you. The argument is that Vattel wrote this was the definition of natural-born citizens and that, due to being familiar with his writings, that was the definition they meant in the Constitution. But the careful reader will notice something odd. The lawsuit quotes from the 1797 edition. However, the Constitution was written in 1787. Unless time travel was somehow involved, they could scarcely have had the 1797 edition influence their thinking a decade prior! They would have had to be using an earlier edition.

And this is a major problem, because as it turns out, the earlier English editions say something else. They do not use "natural born citizen." Rather, they use the term "indigenes." For example, Google Books has a 1787 printing (page 166). You may notice that the phrase "natural born citizen" is not there at all--instead, it writes "indigenes." In this earlier translation, the above phrase reads:

"The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or indigenes, are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist, and perpetuate itself, but by the children of the citizens; those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights."

Similarly, I found this 1760 printing (page 92). It also says "indigenes." It appears that the phrase "Natural born citizens" was not added until the 1797 edition, which appears to have included several revisions. Obviously, that is too late to have informed the thinking of those who wrote the phrase into the Constitution. 

For the curious reader, here is what the original French said:

"Les Naturels ou Indigénes sont ceux qui sont nés dans le pays, de parens citoyens. La société ne pouvant se soutenir & se perpétuer que par les enfans des citoyens; ces enfans y suivent naturellement la condition de leurs peres, & entrent dans tous leurs droits."

The word translated as "natural born citizens" in the later translations is "indigenes" in the original French, which was instead translated as "indigenes" in the earlier English translations. The actual term in the French is not a word that intuitively translates out to "natural born citizen" and it was not in the English translation prior to the Constitution being written and ratified.

Without the phrase "natural born citizen" the argument collapses. At most it can be used to say that whoever revised this may have interpreted "indigenes" to mean the same thing as "natural born citizens" but this would only demonstrate the opinion of an anonymous British editor... not exactly helpful for ascertaining the meaning of an American document. However, even that is not the argument the lawsuit makes; it claims they took it from Vattel, and even go so far later on (at #80) to claim that Vattel was the one who invented the phrase!

How did anyone who wrote this lawsuit not realize that the 1797 edition came after the ratification of the Constitution? A child could have told you that the year 1797 obviously came after the year 1787. Was it dishonesty or incompetence that led them to make this error? I do not know. It's such an obvious error that it is astounding to me that an association that is supposedly out to educate people about the Constitution would make such a mistake--and this isn't just some post on their site, this was a lawsuit they filed. And it must again be stressed that they repeatedly come back to this point of Vattel's work saying natural born citizens and this being the impetus for them using that phrase. But since the French original did not use natural born citizen, nor did any English translation prior to 10 years after the writing of the Constitution, their claim is false.

Interestingly, even this later translation may not support the claim that a natural born citizen requires both parents to be citizens. While it does say "parents" in the plural, note that children is also plural, so it could be referring to just one parent, with parents being plural because it refers to multiple children of different parents.

Regardless of that point, though, the fact is that Vattel did not use the term "natural born citizen" nor does it appear that it wsa used in a translation of his work until 10 years after the writing of the Constitution. And this fact also inverts an earlier argument they made, claiming at #45:

However, there was very little discussion of "natural born Citizen" in Madison's Notes. The only dates where it is even brought up is September 4 and 7 of 1787 (https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_904.asp and https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_907.asp). Plaintiffs are informed and do verily believe, and based thereon allege that this was because it was totally agreed upon, and understood, so no debate ensued.

I agree that it was totally agreed upon and understood. But as noted, this phrase is not found in Vattel. If, as it claims, they were relying on Vattel, why wasn't there any discussion or confusion? Natural born citizen is not found in English translation they had at the time, and it was not a particularly obvious translation from the French. On the other hand, Blackstone's Commentaries do use the similar phrase "natural born subject" in English and was very well known. The lack of debate is actually an argument against the claim that this came from Vattel. It is far more likely this was being taken from Blackstone, who says that someone being a natural born citizen is mostly the result of their place of birth, even if their parents are aliens. Thus their argument of lack of discussion ends up working against them.

At #55 we have another invocation of Natelson:

55. In his Third Edition of The Original Constitution; What it Said and Meant Robert G. Natelson indicated in Footnote No. 377 that, in response to comments that he had made reference to Vattel, that if Vattel's was applied some candidates for the presidency would be disqualified. Plaintiffs are informed and do verily believe, and based thereon respectfully allege that is exactly what the Framers intended by raising the parent requirement of just the father to both parents.

They do not botch this quite as badly as they did the last time they cited Natelson, but it is still problematic. Now, there is no footnote numbered 377. This is because the footnote numbers reset in each chapter. However, if one tallies them up, footnote 377 is footnote 25 in chapter 7 (why in the world they did not simply say footnote 25 in chapter 7, I am not sure). This footnote reads:

"Since the publication of the first edition, several readers have contacted me to argue that "natural born" should be defined as Emer Vattel defined it in his international law treatise. Invariably their argument is driven by hope that Vattel's definition, if applied, would disqualify from the presidency some politician they dislike.
The Constitution's meaning does not, however, depend on one's political hopes. The document generally employed domestic legal terms according to English usage. As Vattel acknowledged, the English standard for "natural born" varied from the international standard with respect to children born within the country; as to children born outside the country, the rules were the same. (Although at one point in his book Vattel wrote of citizenship following "parents," at several later points he clarified that, as in England, foreign-born children followed the status of their fathers.)"

This footnote is in reference to Natelon's statement about the meaning of natural born citizenship discussed earlier (and which was blatantly misrepresented by the lawsuit). The misrepresentation is not as bad here, but it is still a misrepresentation, particularly given the fact it omits the fact Natelson says he does not not think we should be understanding the term from Vattel, and asserts that even under Vattel's ideas, it only required a citizen father.

Regrettably, Natelson in his response does not bring up the larger problems with the claim the term came from Vattel, most importantly the fact that no English translation of his work used "natural born citizen" until after the Constitution was written. As this was a fairly brief footnote it is perhaps understandable he does not go into too much depth, but I think it would have been worth mentioning.

Returning to the lawsuit, at #56 and #57 it quotes from several works by Douglas Gibbs. For example:

In his authoritative text on the Constitution A Promise of American Liberty Gibbs states at pages 349-350:

"Natural Born Citizen: There are different kinds of citizenship. Native born citizenship is normally given to those born on American soil to at least one American Parent. According to the Citizenship Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment, loyalty to the United States would also need to be a factor. A citizen may also gain their citizenship through legal means, known as naturalization. However, according to Article II, to be qualified to hold office as President of the United States, one needs to be a Natural Born Citizen. According to Vatell's Law of Nations, the Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1790, and the opinion of Chief Justice Morrison Waite in the 1875 Minor v. Happersett case, to be a Natural Born Citizen one's parents both need to have been citizens at the time of birth of the child. In the case of Barack Obama, he could have been born on the front steps of the White House and not been a Natural Born Citizen by his own admission."

The lawsuit claims this text is "authoritative". But what exactly makes it such? This, along with the other books by Gibbs cited, all appear to be self-published (on Amazon.com two are listed as published by "CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform" and the other has no publisher listed at all). Perhaps it is supposed to be "authoritative" because the author has great legal credentials? So, just who is this Gibbs?

Douglas Gibbs is one of the plaintiffs in this lawsuit (identified as "Douglas V. Gibbs"), along with "George F.X. Rombach" (the attorney representing the Constitution Association) and "Dennis R. Jackson". All are members of the Constitution Association that brought the lawsuit; George Rombach is identified as the lawyer who filed it. What is notable is that Douglas Gibbs has, as far as I can tell, no qualifications whatsoever to be cited as an authority on law. Indeed, at #10 when discussing the identifies of the plaintiffs, it says he is "an instructor of the Constitution and a radio commentator." Note the lack of mention of being a lawyer or any kind of real legal credentials, even if he does call himself "Mr. Constitution" on his own website. Now, he certainly has the right to write any books he wants about what he thinks about the Constitution. But isn't it very odd to be citing these as if they're some kind of authority (it even calls the first cited book "authoritative")? What makes the self-published works of a non-lawyer in any way "authoritative"? Why are they cited rather than the work of an actual lawyer or legal scholar?

The most charitable interpretation is that it is being offered in order to show that Gibbs was advancing these theories prior to anything involving Harris, to demonstrate it was a belief he had prior. If that is the case, however, it is not clear why it claims a work of his to be "authoritative" or why it cites multiple ones. The usage of "authoritative" shows that this is being invoked as an authority. Which brings us back to the question again of why a self-published work of a non-lawyer is being referred to as authoritative.

There are only two possibilities I can think of, neither of them good. One is that this inclusion was just an attempt to advertise his works. After all, they put the lawsuit documentation on their website and tried to promote the lawsuit. Perhaps these were put in there to advertise them to people reading the lawsuit. The other option that the writers of this lawsuit, Gibbs quite likely being one of them as he was one of the plaintiffs, somehow had such a high opinion of Gibbs that they think he can be cited as an authority instead of any legal scholar, which is obviously absurd. The fact they cite the self-published writings of someone with no legal credentials ends up weakening their argument, as it indicates they had nothing better to cite. I suppose they cite Natelson, but as noted they misrepresent him.

In regards to the arguments raised by the text it claims to be "authoritative," Vattel has been discussed already. Minor v. Happersett and the Naturalization Act of 1790 will be discussed later (for a short answer, though: Minor v. Happersett gives no answer on the subject and the portion of the Naturalization Act of 1790 being cited as requiring children to have citizens as parents is referring to people born outside of the United States).

At #59, we read:

Although the Framers knew what a natural born Citizen was, they also knew it was not possible to satisfy that requirement when the Constitution was established since they were not natural born Citizens in that everyone born prior to the Declaration of Independence was born a subject of the King of England, and not a citizen. The Framers, along with their fellow countrymen, were transformed, or naturalized, into citizens by means of the Declaration of Independence as of the 4th day of July, 1776. Prior to that date there were no citizens. Therefore, the Framers had a choice 1) to wait twenty-four years until the first natural born citizen had reached the age requirement or 2) to grandfather themselves, along with their fellow countrymen, into the requirement. They chose the latter in order to have the office of President function. 

This is perhaps a minor point in the grand scheme of things, but I should note that this claim, that the founders were not natural born citizens, has actually been disputed. For example, consider this statement by John Jay in a letter to George Washington midway through the Constitutional Convention (July 25, 1987):

"Permit me to hint, whether it would not be wise & seasonable to provide a strong check to the admission of Foreigners into the administration of our national Government, and to declare expressly that the Command in chief of the american army shall not be given to, nor devolved on, any but a natural born Citizen."

Note that John Jay does not say that it should only be a natural born citizen or current citizen. He says nobody but a natural born citizen. If no one born prior to the Declaration of Independence was a natural born citizen, he has just excluded everyone older than 11 years old from the presidency; given the age requirement for the presidency, it means no one would be eligible. If we take John Jay's words at face value, it seems clear he believed that people born prior to the Declaration of the Independence could be natural born citizens.

Perhaps John Jay just phrased himself poorly, or he thought that the inclusion of current citizens was so obvious he did not need to specify it. However, it could very well be that he was suggesting that it only apply to natural born citizens, and that all the people born in America, including those born prior to the Declaration of Independence, qualified as such.

Why, then, did the Constitution include the statement of including people who were citizens at the time of the ratification of the Constitution? According to Justice Story in Section 1473 of his Commentaries on the Constitution of the US (1833):

"It is indispensable, too, that the president should be a natural born citizen of the United States; or a citizen at the adoption of the constitution, and for fourteen years before his election. This permission of a naturalized citizen to become president is an exception from the great fundamental policy of all governments, to exclude foreign influence from their executive councils and duties. It was doubtless introduced (for it has now become by lapse of time merely nominal, and will soon become wholly extinct) out of respect to those distinguished revolutionary patriots, who were born in a foreign land, and yet had entitled themselves to high honors in their adopted country. A positive exclusion of them from the office would have been unjust to their merits, and painful to their sensibilities."

Emphasis added. Note Story's explanation. He does not say that it was there in order to avoid the problem that no born prior to 1776 was a natural born citizen, and indeed his statement makes it obvious he would disagree with such an idea. He instead asserts it was there so that people who were born outside of the United States, but had joined it as citizens prior to the Constitution, should be eligible (this would therefore not have been the case had they followed John Jay's suggestion to allow only natural born citizens). A possible example would be Alexander Hamilton, who was born in the West Indies rather than the area that would become the United States.

This is perhaps not of major importance, I will grant, and ordinarily I would not bring it up. However, given the lawsuit decided to bring up this point, I felt it should be noted that there is at least room for debate.

At #61, it makes a brief argument for originalism and that in the case of natural born citizen we should interpret it in the way "a reasonable person living at the time would have determined the meaning to be." I am in complete agreement with this. The problem is that for reasons already discussed (most importantly, the meaning of the analogous term natural born subject indicating natural born citizen meant almost anyone born in the United States regardless of their parentage; see for example the Michael Ramsey article linked earlier), it seems clear to me that the original understanding was not the one promoted by this lawsuit.

There is a bit of an oddity in the lawsuit here, actually. It refers to an address of Justice Antonin Scalia at the 2008 Annual National Lawyers Convention, and offers the link of http://fedsoc.org/publications/pubid.1193/pub_detail.asp. The problem is that this link, even at the time of the lawsuit, does not work. This lawsuit was filed in December of 2020, and as we can see on The Wayback Machine, it was a dead link at least as far back as January 2019. We can be fairly certain there was previously something there prior, or else The Wayback Machine would not have archived it at all, but it appears to have only attempted the archive after it was removed. Nor can we suppose that maybe it was put back later on in time for the lawsuit, for an archive on January of 2021 was also dead. So by the time the lawsuit was issued, this was a dead link. It therefore looks rather bad on them that they did not apparently bother to check that the URL they offered was active before filing the lawsuit.

At #62, we find an odd argument. It claims that:

According to the testimony of Benjamin Franklin, during the Constitutional Convention the Framers did not invent the notion 'natural born citizen'; they were merely applying the Law of Nature to questions of citizenship as set forth by Vattel in his publication entitled, The Law of Nations. The Framers were consulting at least three copies of Vattel's publication, which they had in their possession, when they wrote the Constitution.

While the fact the Law of Nations in French did not say "natural born citizen" and the English at the time did not include it has already rendered this largely irrelevant, it is still an odd argument. It says "according to the testimony of Benjamin Franklin." What testimony? Nothing is cited here. Earlier (at #51) it mentions that Benjamin Franklin refers to them having three copies of The Law of Nations during the Continental Congress, but that was a separate meeting from the Constitutional Convention referred to here. While it is true that they both are 2-word titles that have each word begin with "Con," they are nevertheless quite different meetings. It appears the lawsuit has managed to get these two completely different meetings mixed up.

The "testimony" of Benjamin Franklin therefore amounts to nothing more than the mention they were reading the book during the Continental Congress (again, not the Constitutional Convention), and in his letter he says absolutely nothing about it having any influence on citizenship views. The letter in question is this one, and the word "citizen" is found nowhere in it.

Much of what follows is simply trying to show that some Founders were aware of Vattel or talking more about Vattel, all of which has become irrelevant because natural born citizen is not mentioned by Vattel. Throughout all of this, no discussion is made of Blackstone's commentary even though he most certainly did use the term "natural born subject" (which the lawsuit said was where the term natural born citizen came from!) and attested that people born of aliens in the British dominion were natural born subjects.

The lawsuit also argues that the the natural born citizen requirement was because the framers of the Constitution did not want the president to be a foreigner; this is true, but this is nevertheless accomplished if we take natural born citizen to refer to someone as being a citizen from birth, as it would prevent a foreigner from coming to the United States and becoming president.

Eventually we come to the following:

72. David Ramsay, M.D., an American physician, public official, and one of the first major historians of the American Revolutionary War, wrote "A Dissertation on the Manner of Acquiring the Character and Privileges of a Citizen of the United States". He had the advantage of being involved in the events of which he wrote and he exercised wisdom of mind and spirit which marks the pages of his works, his critical sense, his balanced judgment and compassion. These gifts, which were uniquely his own, clearly entitle him to an honorable position in the front rank of American historians. His dissertation published in 1789 states:

'The citizenship of no man could be previous to the Declaration of Independence, and as a natural right, belongs to none but those who have been born of citizens since the Fourth of July, 1776".

He further defined the term 'natural born citizens': as the children born in the country to citizen parents.

Despite it saying he "further defined" the term natural born citizen, one may notice the fact this term is not used in the quote; indeed, Ramsay never uses the phrase natural born citizen anywhere that I see in this writing of his. Is the lawsuit simply assuming that because he uses the phrase "natural" that somehow automatically equates to "natural born citizen"?

Even if we were to suppose that this was to be equated with natural born citizen, there are some reasons to not view Ramsay as an authority on this. He was not at the Constitutional Convention, and we know that some of his views on citizenship were overwhelmingly rejected by Congress, including every member of Congress who was at the Constitutional Convention, such as James Madison.

You see, in 1789, William Loughton Smith was elected to the House of Representatives from North Carolina, defeating David Ramsay. Ramsay disputed this election, asserting that Smith did not fulfill the requirement of having been 7 years a citizen to be elected to the House of Representatives; although born in South Carolina in 1758, Smith at the time of the American Revolution was in Europe and did not return to America until November 1783, after the war had ended. As Smith had returned 6 years ago, Ramsay petitioned the House of Representatives to recognize Smith as ineligible, saying he had therefore not been a citizen for the required 7 years.

The dissertation being referred to by the lawsuit was in relation to this matter. Although the dissertation itself (which can be read here) only gives the year 1789 as its publication date, leaving it unclear whether it came before or after the dispute, a letter to Elias Boudinot makes it clear it was printed in connection with the dispute. This letter can be found (among other places) on page 124 of " David Ramsay, 1749-1815. Selections from His Writings" by Robert Brunhouse, and can be viewed here. Sent on March 31 of 1789, Ramsay mentions in the letter:

"The enclosed dissertation I sent sometime ago to Mr Hazard to be printed & offered for sale & a copy to be sent by the printer as from himself to every member of Congress."

So this dissertation was written in conjunction with this dispute over William Smith's election. While this dissertation itself was written to work as a standalone document and does not mention the election dispute, we can see the same kinds of points from it used in his petition to congress on the subject. I do not know if the full petition to congress is available; the congressional record only quotes from select portions of it. But observe this portion from it that was quoted in the congressional record:

"That citizenship with the United States is an adventitious character to every person possessing it, who is now thirty years of age; and that it can, in no case, have been acquired but in one of the following modes: 1st, By birth or inheritance. 2dly, By having been a party to the late revolution. 3dly, By taking an oath of fidelity to some of the States. 4thly, By tacit consent. 5thly, By adoption."

Compare this to what he says in the dissertation:

"The following appear to be the only modes of acquiring this distinguishing privilege. 1st. By being parties to the original compact, the declaration of independence. 2d. By taking a law of fidelity to some of the United States, agreeably to law. 3d. By tacit consent and acquiescence. 4th. By birth or inheritance. 5th. By adoption."

We can clearly see the same principles are being used in each, even if they are in a different order. One may see the petition (and the discussion on the subject in congress) in the original Congressional Register here, or (if the old printing is annoying) one may see it it here.

At any rate, at least some of Ramsay's views of citizenship--and most especially the claim Smith was ineligible--were, as noted, rejected by congress. James Madison in particular had some to say about it in his rejection, which can be viewed at those links or, if you want solely his statements, here. Interestingly, Madison makes the following statement:

"It is an established maxim that birth is a criterion of allegiance. Birth however derives its force sometimes from place and sometimes from parentage, but in general place is the most certain criterion; it is what applies in the United States; it will therefore be unnecessary to investigate any other. Mr. Smith founds his claim upon his birthright; his ancestors were among the first settlers of that colony."

How this relates to the question of birthright and/or natural-born citizenship has been disputed. Regardless of how to interpret that particular statement by Madison, he rejects Ramsay's views, as did the rest of the Congress overwhelmingly (36-1). As noted above, every person in the House of Representatives who was at the Constitutional Convention rejected the petition; the only person who supported Ramsay was not at the convention.

So as we can see, Ramsay was--at least in some aspects--in a decided minority when it came to the question of citizenship, with ideas that were rejected. This, of course, does not mean everything in his dissertation was regarded as wrong, but it does mean we should be viewing its claims with caution. And it should not be forgotten the whole reason Ramsay wrote the dissertation was because he lost the election to the guy he was claiming was ineligible; he wasn't a neutral party in the slightest. Combined with the fact he never used the phrase natural born citizen, Ramsay is rather clearly a rather weak source for the meaning of the phrase.

Given the above considerations, it should be fairly obvious why the next thing the lawsuit says (#73) has major problems:

Ramsay's Dissertation is further evidence of the influence that Vattel had on the Framers in how they defined the new national citizenship. Being a meticulous historian, Ramsey would have obtained his definition from the general consensus that existed at the time. This work is evidence of how a very influential Founder defined a "natural born Citizen" and it provides one of the most important proofs which provides direct and convincing evidence on how the Framers defined a "natural born Citizen". Based thereon there can be no doubt that their definition was one as "a child born in the country to citizen parents".

The lawsuit claims that "Ramsey would have obtained his definition from the general consensus that existed at the time" (the typo of Ramsey instead of Ramsay is in the original lawsuit). Even ignoring that Ramsay offered no explicit definition of "natural born citizen" given that he never used the phrase, the assumption that Ramsay would have "obtained his definition from the general consensus that existed at the time" is shown to be unwarranted given that at least some of his ideas were overwhelmingly rejected by the consensus, or at least that of the House of Representatives. Thus it appears he was not obtaining all of his definitions from the general consensus. Now, just because he deviated from the consensus on one point does not mean he deviated from it in every other, but it means one must look at his ideas more skeptically. It certainly is a demonstration that the lawsuit's claim that he "would have obtained his definition from the general consensus that existed at the time" is unwarranted.

The lawsuit claims this is "one of the most important proofs" of how they defined natural born citizen. Let us review: At least some of his views on citizenship were overwhelmingly rejected by the House of Representatives, including every member who was at the Constitutional Convention. And even if we were to suppose he got the rest of it right, note he never used the term "natural born citizen". If this is (as they claim) one of their best proofs, then perhaps we can end right there if the best proof is so obviously weak.

Continuing with the lawsuit, I'll skip over some paragraphs that are not really important to our purposes, though I want to note again that at #80 the lawsuit makes the completely inaccurate claim that "The United States is only the second such example in the world to establish the definition of the natural born concept which is found only in Vattel, who gave it the name: Natural Born Citizen." Yet again, Vattel never gave this name. How do they expect people to take this lawsuit seriously if it makes such blatant objective historical errors? If they don't care enough about accuracy to avoid such an error, why should I trust them on accuracy in anything else they have to say?

After this, it tries to cite some case law; all of these cases are repeated in the NFRA platform mentioned at the start (the NFRA does add Perkins v. Elg, though). Let's go through them.

At #81a, the lawsuit cites the 1814 case The Venus. It claims:

This case was decided at the beginning of the republic by men who were intimately associated with the American Revolution. The Venus case regarded the question whether the cargo of a merchant vessel, named the Venus, belonging to an American citizen, and being shipped from British territory to America during the War of 1812, could be seized and taken as a prize by an American privateer. But what the case said about citizenship, is what matters here. Justice Livingston, who wrote the unanimous decision, quoted the entire §212 from the French edition, using his own English, on p. 12 of the ruling:"

Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says:" then set forth § 212. supra

And right from here the lawsuit makes some embarrassing errors. The case can be seen here. The lawsuit claims "Livingston, who wrote the unanimous decision". Justice Livingston didn't write the decision. Justice Washington did. The opinion states "The following were the facts of the case, as stated by WASHINGTON, J. in delivering the opinion of the Court".

So this majority opinion was written by Justice Washington, not Justice Livingston. The quote offered is not from the majority opinion, but was instead from a separate opinion written by Chief Justice Marshall, which was joined by Justice Livingston, though not the other justices (thus not unanimous).

While the misidentifying of the author is embarrassing, claiming this separate opinion was unanimous when it was not is even worse. Now, in the actual majority opinion, Vattel is mentioned briefly in the majority opinion, but only to mention a distinguishing between "a temporary residence in a foreign country for a special purpose and a residence accompanied with an intention to make it a permanent place of abode." Nothing is said at all or implied about the citizenry of those individuals.

But what of Marshall's separate opinion? Well, his opinion was clearly not "unanimous" because only one other justice joined it. Still, Marshall (the longest-serving Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in US history and most likely the most influential justice of all time) is an extremely respected jurist and his opinions are given considerable respect. So perhaps his opinion is worth trusting simply on that grounds, even if the lawsuit was wrong in claiming it was a unanimous opinion. But we run into further problems with the lawsuit's invocation of his opinion. First, the lawsuit does not mention that the phrase "natural born citizen" is not found in this quotation. Here is exactly what he says:

"Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says
"The citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives or indigenes are those born in the country of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights.""

As we can see, this is simply quoting from the original English translation which used indigenes. The lawsuit does not actually provide the quote that Marshall uses and thus never explicitly admits that the term "Natural born citizen" is not found in it. Still, while evasively avoiding admitting this, it does seem to try to deflect the difference by claiming he quoted "from the French edition, using his own English". Actually, he was just quoting the original English translation that was available at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, as we have seen, and would seem to be evidence that the earlier translation was the more commonly known version even then.

However, as noted, the entire section by Vattel is quoted, not merely the part about birth citizenship. The quotation continues:

"The inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens, are strangers who are permitted to settle and stay in the country. Bound by their residence to the society, they are subject to the laws of the state while they reside there, and they are obliged to defend it because it grants them protection, though they do not participate in all the rights of citizens. They enjoy only the advantages which the laws or custom gives them. The perpetual inhabitants are those who have received the right of perpetual residence. These are a kind of citizens of an inferior order, and are united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages.
The domicile is the habitation fixed in any place with an intention of always staying there. A man does not, then, establish his domicile in any place unless he makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. However, this declaration is no reason why, if he afterwards changes his mind, he may not remove his domicile elsewhere. In this sense, he who stops, even for a long time, in a place for the management of his affairs has only a simple habitation there, but has no domicile."

And then Marshall, giving his own commentary, says:

"A domicile, then, in the sense in which this term is used by Vattel, requires not only actual residence in a foreign country, but "an intention of always staying there." Actual residence without this intention amounts to no more than "simple habitation.""

The reason he's citing Vattel isn't for Vattel's distinction between the citizens and natives/indigenes regarding birth. That's irrelevant to the case. His citation is to focus on the domicile portion. The natives/indigenes part appears to have only been quoted because he was quoting the entire section, but it is not in any way endorsed or commented on; the only part that is really relevant, as shown by the fact it is the only portion he comments on, is the last paragraph.

And so our lawsuit misidentifies the author of the opinion cited and misrepresents it as unanimous when it was not (only two justices joined it). It's very shocking that a lawsuit brought by an actual lawyer would be unable to properly identify this information. While perhaps the identity of the author of this Supreme Court opinion is not so important in terms of the strength of the argument (though it is another sign of the sloppiness of the arguments), the fact the portion they quote from is not unanimous is a major blow to their claims. And then they go on to try to claim this quotation proves something about natural born citizens when the phrase isn't there, the issue isn't being discussed, and the focus is on a different portion of that section of Vattel's work.

And all these errors are from an organization that claims to educate people about the meaning of the Constitution!

At #81b, it cites Shanks v. Dupont from 1830:

The Supreme Court heard the case regarding the dispute over the inheritance received by two daughters of an American colonist, from South Carolina. At the beginning of the case, Justice Story, who gave the ruling, does not cite Vattel per se, but cites the principle of citizenship enshrined in his definition of a 'natural born citizen':

"Ann Scott was born in South Carolina before the American revolution, and her father adhered to the American cause and remained and was at his death a citizen of South Carolina. There is no dispute that his daughter Ann, at the time of the Revolution and afterwards, remained in South Carolina until December, 1782. Whether she was of age during this time does not appear. If she was, then her birth and residence might be deemed to constitute her by election a citizen of South Carolina. If she was not of age, then she might well be deemed under the circumstances of this case to hold the citizenship of her father, for children born in a country, continuing while under age in the family of the father, partake of his national character as a citizen of that country. Her citizenship, then, being prima facie established, and indeed this is admitted in the pleadings, has it ever been lost, or was it lost before the death of her father, so that the estate in question was, upon the descent cast, incapable of vesting in her? Upon the facts stated, it appears to us that it was not lost and that she was capable of taking it at the time of the descent cast. " (emphasis added)

There is something interesting here. The lawsuit (and the NFRA) has claimed that a child needs both parents to be citizens. But even if we were to conclude that this case is giving some definite requirement for citizenship, it only lists the father ("children born in a country, continuing while under age in the family of the father"). Their source, even if we suppose this is giving the rules for natural born citizenship, goes against their claim, as it would only require this of the father, not both parents.

But we run into larger problems with this citation. The question here was not concerning the requirements for gaining citizenship, but the requirements for maintaining it. That's why it says children "continuing while under age in the family of the father, partake of his national character as a citizen of that country." Unless the lawsuit is claiming that someone can acquire natural born citizenship at some point after birth, which it obviously is not, it is fairly obvious the issue here is not natural born citizenship. It is, again, the question of whether she maintained her citizenship, which is what the mention of continuing under age in the family of the father alludes to. Thus this provides nothing useful for the lawsuit.

Now we come to the case that caused the NFRA platform to become so notorious, in #81c:

Supreme Court Justice, Peter Vivian Daniel, considered natural born citizen as every person born of citizen parents within the United States. In 1857, in a concurring opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford he quoted an English-language translation of Emerich de Vattel's 1758 treatise The Law of Nations (Le Droit des gens), stating that:

"The natives, or natural-born citizens, are those born in the country of parents who are citizens". emphasis added)

To be clear, the lack of an opening parenthetical for "emphasis added" was in the original lawsuit.

Dred Scott v. Sandford (which has been mostly rendered moot by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments) is generally considered one of the worst Supreme Court decisions in history. It declared that blacks were constitutionally ineligible to be citizens in the United States and that the federal government could not free slaves brought into the territories or ban slavery therein (the territories were the areas part of the United States but not admitted as states), striking down the Missouri Compromise. Both of these claims rested on highly questionable reasoning and have been strongly criticized on legal grounds. It is also often asserted that it led to the Civil War, though historians have been split on whether this is true or not.

Dred Scott's notoriety is so great that it has become the go-to case to draw unfavorable comparisons with to any case you dislike and to try to connect it to any judicial philosophies you dislike; both liberals and conservatives have been extremely happy to use it to do so. It has been rejected to an extent I am not sure any other case of the Supreme Court has been. Even in the handful of modern cases where it is used as some kind of precedent, one sees some feeling of regret by the author for doing so, as seen in its brief invocation in the relatively recent New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen:

"Even before the Civil War commenced in 1861, this Court indirectly affirmed the importance of the right to keep and bear arms in public. Writing for the Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393 (1857), Chief Justice Taney offered what he thought was a parade of horribles that would result from recognizing that free blacks were citizens of the United States. If blacks were citizens, Taney fretted, they would be entitled to the privileges and immunities of citizens, including the right “to keep and carry arms wherever they went.” Id., at 417 (emphasis added). Thus, even Chief Justice Taney recognized (albeit unenthusiastically in the case of blacks) that public carry was a component of the right to keep and bear arms—a right free blacks were often denied in antebellum America."

And yes, even this brief and somewhat apologetic invocation of Dred Scott in the opinion came under some fire. It is very important that a reader understand the extremely low reputation that Dred Scott has. Even those few I have seen who have attempted defenses of it in the modern day will still acknowledge the decision is flawed.

Thus is it downright incredible that anyone would, without a hint of apology or regret, cite Dred Scott as precedent. This is why the NFRA platform caught such criticism from the fact it cites Dred Scott. At first glance the lawsuit seems to be an improvement because it cites not the notorious majority opinion, but a separate opinion. The problem is that Peter Daniel's opinion is quite arguably more extreme than the majority opinion.

But even if we were to ignore these facts, we run into problems with citing Daniel's opinion. We should consider why he is quoting Vattel at all. He is not trying to make some kind of judgment on natural-born citizens (he never uses the term outside of the quote itself, which comes from the later translation which used the term natural-born citizen, which as has been noted was not made until after the Constitutional Convention); his whole reason for discussing this is to draw a distinction between citizen and slave.

Even if we were to suppose that he was trying to make a point about natural born citizens, if the opinion of a single justice who was on the court during Dred Scott can be cited as precedence, what of this section from Justice Curtis's opinion? Emphasis added:

"The first section of the second article of the Constitution uses the language, "a natural-born citizen." It thus assumes that citizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the Constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which referred citizenship to the place of birth. At the Declaration of Independence, and ever since, the received general doctrine has been in conformity with the common law that free persons born within either of the colonies were subjects of the King that by the Declaration of Independence, and the consequent acquisition of sovereignty by the several States, all such persons ceased to be subjects, and became citizens of the several States, except so far as some of them were disfranchised by the legislative power of the States, or availed themselves, seasonably, of the right to adhere to the British Crown in the civil contest, and thus to continue British subjects."

It is true this is the dissent. However, if a single justice's opinion is apparently precedent, then why is this single justice's opinion ignored? The fact it's a dissent rather than a concurrence? Dred Scott is a criticized enough case that if anything the dissents are viewed as having greater precedent than anything else in it.

So this invocation of Dred Scott is an invocation of a discredited opinion by a single justice who is not actually trying to make any specific point about natural born citizens. Meanwhile, the not-discredited opinion by Curtis indicates that natural born citizenship comes from location rather than parentage.

We come to #81d next, concerning Minor v. Happersett:

Mrs. Minor, an original suffragette, who in virtue of the 14th Amendment attempted to register to vote in the State of Missouri, and was refused because she was not a man. Chief Justice Morrison Waite wrote the majority opinion, in which he stated:

"The Constitution does not in words say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents." (emphasis added)
 
Did the lawsuit's authors miss the final sentence of their quote, where it says that some authorities include children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents? It's right there in the quote! Indeed, the decision--immediately after that quote--makes it clear it is not making any statement on whether such people are natural born citizens:

"As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts. It is sufficient for everything we have now to consider that all children born of citizen parents within the jurisdiction are themselves citizens."

The Supreme Court opinion here explicitly declines to give any ruling on the question of whether children of non-citizen parents born in the United States are natural born citizens, it not being necessary to the case. This means that this case is, ultimately, not particularly useful in either direction. Were the writers of the lawsuit just so excited about this quote they didn't read any further past it, and in fact appear not to have even read the full quote they did provide?

Last is #81e, which is a citation of United States v. Wong Kim Ark. This is the entirety of what the lawsuit has to say about it, and it is highly puzzling:

Wong Kim Ark, the son of two resident Chinese aliens, claimed U.S. Citizenship and was vindicated by the court on the basis of the 14th Amendment. In this case Justice Gray gave the opinion of the court. On p. 168-9 of the record, He cites approvingly the decision in Minor vs. Happersett (supra):

"At common law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children, born in a country of parents who were its citizens, became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. " (emphasis added)

The lawsuit acts as if United States v. Wong Kim Ark supports it, but Wong Kim Ark is basically one big argument against this lawsuit's claims. To try to cite it as if it supports their point is very puzzling.

What is especially odd is it mentions it quoting Minor v. Happersett with approval. Not mentioned is the fact it quotes other decisions with approval that clearly show an interpretation of natural born citizen being in reference to place of birth, not parentage. This includes the Dred Scott dissent discussed above:

"In Dred Scott v. Sandford, (1857) 19 How. 393, Mr. Justice Curtis said:
"The first section of the second article of the Constitution uses the language, 'a natural-born citizen.' It thus assumes that citizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the Constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which referred citizenship to the place of birth."
19 How. 60 U. S. 576. And, to this extent, no different opinion was expressed or intimated by any of the other judges.
In United States v. Rhodes (1866), Mr. Justice Swayne, sitting in the Circuit Court, said:
"All persons born in the allegiance of the King are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. . . . We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution.""

Thus we can see it quotes Justice Curtis's dissenting opinion from Dred Scott (discussed above) with approval, in which Curtis says "Undoubtedly, this language of the Constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which referred citizenship to the place of birth." The Wong Kim Ark decision, if its reasoning is taken as fully binding, is actually a death knell to their entire case. The only way for the lawsuit to persist with their claim in the face of Wong Kim Ark is to either try to dismiss remarks like the above as mere dicta or to say the case was decided incorrectly and should be overturned. To cite it as precedent in favor of their position is absurd.

So much for these cases it cites; for those curious about Perkins v. Elg, this will be discussed later when we return to the NFRA (short summary: The only thing it says about natural born citizens is that the person involved was one, which is a major problem for the NFRA and Constitution Center given that only one of her parents was a citizen). Continuing, #82 claims "The Supreme Court of the United States has never applied the term 'natural born citizen' to any other category than "those born in the country of parents who are citizens thereof at that time". Note this is stated immediately after it referred to Wong Kim Ark, an opinion that very much did exactly what it claims it never did.

Subsequently it tries again to mention a Founder was aware of Vattel (irrelevant for reasons given before, namely the fact Vattel never said anything about natural born citizens) and then waxes on a bit about how the only way to change the Constitution is by amendment, not reinterpretation. Most of this requires little commentary, but there are a few points I will discuss. First I wish to discuss this portion at #84 regarding the Naturalization Act of 1790, as it was mentioned earlier in the lawsuit:

Legislative activity by the early Congresses provides insight into the question of Vattel's requirement of two parents to be citizens. There are Congressional acts that were passed after the Constitution was adopted that give us insight into what the Framers of the Constitution meant by"natural born Citizen". The First Congress, which included members who had been delegates to the Constitutional Convention and drafted the "natural born Citizen" clause, passed the Naturalization Act of 1790 (I Stat.103,104) which provided that "And the children of citizens of the United States that may be born beyond the sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born citizens." (emphasis added) It is interesting to note that George Washington was president of the Constitutional Convention and President of the United States when this bill became law and if he had disagreed with the two citizen-parent requirement, he could have vetoed this bill. Based thereon this legislation strongly suggests that the Framers of the Constitution understood this phrase to refer to citizenship acquired from both of the child's parents at birth. This statute shows what role the parents played in the minds of the early founders and Framers.  

The problem with the lawsuit using this should seem to be obvious: This is in reference to people born outside of the United States to citizens of the United States. Requiring parents to be citizens in such a case does not mean there was any such requirement for people born in the United States. As was discussed earlier, in British common law someone would be a natural born subject if born within the domains of the king regardless of their parentage (unless child of an ambassador or foreign sovereign) but could also be a natural born subject born outside of the domains of the king if a law was passed to provide for it, as some were, granting natural born subject status to those born to natural born subjects outside of the domains of the king. The requirements were stricter to be a natural born subject when born outside of the king's domains.

Thus, requirements of citizen parents for natural born citizen status for children born outside of the United States does not mean that this was a requirement for children born inside the United States. Even without the context of natural born subjects, this fact should be obvious. Thus this law means essentially nothing when it comes to the question of natural born citizens within the United States.

Although not brought up in the lawsuit, I should briefly discuss something some bring up, which is to note that the Naturalization Act of 1795 removed the mention of natural born citizens. You see, the Act of 1790 said "the children of citizens of the United States that may be born beyond Sea, or out of the limits of the United States, shall be considered as natural born Citizens". The 1795 Act instead said "the children of citizens of the United States, born out of the limits and jurisdiction of the United States, shall be considered as citizens of the United State". Some have claimed this means those born outside the US, even to citizen parents, are ineligible, given that neither the 1795 Act nor any subsequent one includes the mention of them being natural born citizens. Unfortunately, there seems no indication in the congressional record as to why this change occurred, nor was there any debate on that (although there was debate on various other things that the 1795 law modified from the 1790). My viewpoint is that, because natural born citizen was understood to be a citizen at birth, the explicit usage of the phrase was seen as unnecessary. The lack of any apparent debate or discussion on this change is therefore explained by it not being seen as a change. Regardless, while this question may concern other possible candidates for president (it got some attention when Ted Cruz was running in 2016), it does not concern the candidates under examination; namely, Kamala Harris in the lawsuit, or Nikki Haley and Vivek Ramaswamy in regards to the NFRA's platform, as all of these were born in the United States.

I also do want to note this from #93:

Plaintiffs are informed and do verily believe, and based thereon allege that there is no other evidence than that which has set forth herein of the meaning of "natural born Citizen" to the Framers when the Constitution was written in 1787 and Ratified 1788 which is the 'children born in the country of parents who are citizens of that country at that time'.

There is no other evidence than that which has been set forth? Well, for starters, there's Natelson's work, which they explicitly cited, and goes against this claim. And are they actually unaware of things like Blackstone's Commentaries? Or of quotes like the following by William Rawle?

"Therefore every person born within the United States, its territories or districts, whether the parents are citizens or aliens, is a natural born citizen in the sense of the constitution."
("A view of the Constitution of the United States of America" Second Edition (1829), page 86)

Any small amount of research in regards to arguments by those who assert that the term natural born citizen applies to all citizens at birth would easily uncover various evidences against their position which they never address. If they are claiming that they believe there is "no other evidence than that which has set forth herein" then it appears they are either very ignorant or are trying to deceive the reader.

#94 discusses the Fourteenth Amendment and attempts to claim that it makes no change to the natural born citizen requirement that (according to them) requires both parents to be citizens. But as has been noted, natural born subjects were normally decided by place rather than by ancestry, and there is no reason to think that natural born citizen was meant in anything other than taken from that, particularly given the lack of questions about it at the Constitutional Convention. So its claim that the Citizenship Clause only granted citizenship to more people without making them natural born citizens is ultimately irrelevant. I would assert, in common with Michael Ramsey's article that has been linked, that the most plausible interpretation is that the Citizenship Clause made it clear that everyone born in the United States (with some exceptions, though not relevant to the case of people like Harris) is a citizen regardless of the citizenry of their parent and are all natural born citizens.

After referring to Happersett and Wong Kim Ark and making the same errors discussed above, it claims at #97:

During the debates that embroiled the Senate in the years following the Civil War, Senator Howard insisted that the qualifying phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof' be inserted into Section I of the 14th Amendment being considered by his colleagues. In the speech with which he proposed the alteration, Howard declared:

"This amendment which I have offered is simply declaratory of what I regard as the law of the land already, that every person born within the limits of the United States, and subject to their jurisdiction, is by virtue of natural law and national law a citizen of the United States. This will not, of course, include persons born in the United States who are foreigners, aliens, [or] who belong to the families of ambassadors or foreign ministers ..." (emphasis added) 

The insertion of the "[or]" is misleading. As I discussed in a prior post, the subsequent discussion makes it abundantly clear that Howard was not excluding aliens (as the inserted "or" tries to make it sound). An argument immediately erupts between Senators about the wisdom of making everyone born in the US citizens, and no one, including Howard, steps in to say they are arguing on mistaken premises. Most likely, Howard was using aliens as a clarification for the meaning of foreigners, but the person who was transcribing the speeches did not catch that and used a comma instead of putting hyphens around the word aliens.

It then moves on to cases about the Fourteenth Amendment, citing The Slaughter-House Cases at #98a.

In The Slaughter-House Cases explaining the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment clause, the Supreme Court said regarding the citizenship clause:

"[t]he phrase, 'subject to the jurisdiction thereof,' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States." (emphasis added)

Even the dissenting opinion affirmed that the citizenship clause was designed to assure that all persons born within the United States were both citizens of the United States and the state in which they resided, provided they were not at the time of birth subjects of any foreign power. 

Let's start with the majority opinion. The majority opinion does say this. I contend it is wrong, for reasons I discussed in my previously linked post. But more importantly, this is a side remark in dicta. It has nothing to do with the case. It is a brief statement by the Supreme Court on an issue they were presumably not briefed at all on, did not discuss in the opinion, and was quite frankly of no importance to the case. At any rate, Wong Kim Ark renders this bit of side dicta irrelevant. Indeed, Wong Kim Ark explicitly disclaims that portion of The Slaughterhouse Cases:

"Mr. Justice Miller, indeed, while discussing the causes which led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, made this remark: "The phrase, 'subject to its jurisdiction,' was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers, consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States, born within the United States." 16 Wall. 73. This was wholly aside from the question in judgment, and from the course of reasoning bearing upon that question. It was unsupported by any argument, or by any reference to authorities; and that it was not formulated with the same care and exactness, as if the case before the court had called for an exact definition of the phrase, is apparent from its classing foreign ministers and consuls together — whereas it was then well settled law, as has since been recognized in a judgment of this court in which Mr. Justice Miller concurred, that consuls, as such, and unless expressly invested with a diplomatic character in addition to their ordinary powers, are not considered as entrusted with authority to represent their sovereign in his intercourse with foreign States or to vindicate his prerogatives, or entitled by the law of nations to the privileges and immunities of ambassadors or public ministers, but are subject to the jurisdiction, civil and criminal, of the courts of the country in which they reside. 1 Kent Com. 44; Story Conflict of Laws, § 48; Wheaton International Law, (8th ed.) § 249; The Anne, (1818) 3 Wheat. 435, 445, 446; Gittings v. Crawford, (1838) Taney, 1, 10; In re Baiz, (1890) 135 U.S. 403, 424."

Emphasis added.

Returning to the lawsuit, the lawsuit's claim that "Even the dissenting opinion affirmed that the citizenship clause was designed to assure that all persons born within the United States were both citizens of the United States and the state in which they resided, provided they were not at the time of birth subjects of any foreign power" is a bit confusing. It is not clear if the lawsuit is saying that the dissent agreed with the majority opinion that the Citizenship Clause excluded children of citizens/subjects of other countries that were in the United States, or if it is merely saying that the dissent affirmed that the purpose of it was to make people born in the United States both citizens of their state and the United States without taking a position on who qualified as being subjects of a foreign power. If it is the latter, it seems not particularly relevant. If it is the former--that is, agreeing with the interpretation that it excludes children of citizens of other countries born in the United States--then it looks to me like the dissent says the opposite:

"The first clause of the fourteenth amendment changes this whole subject, and removes it from the region of discussion and doubt. It recognizes in express terms, if it does not create, citizens of the United States, and it makes their citizenship dependent upon the place of their birth, or the fact of their adoption, and not upon the constitution or laws of any State or the condition of their ancestry."

This states that the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment makes their citizenship dependent on the place of the birth, and not upon the condition of their ancestry. While this seems to be more referring specifically to slavery, the statement made nevertheless fits perfectly the idea that it is place of birth that decides citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, not one's parentage.

In #98b, another case is cited:

In Elk v. Wilkins, the Supreme Court specifically addressed what is meant by "subject to the jurisdiction thereof," and held:

"The persons declared to be citizens are 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.' The evident meaning of these last words is not merely subject in some respect or degree to the jurisdiction of the United States, but completely subject to their political jurisdiction and owing them direct and immediate allegiance. And the words relate to the time of birth in the one case, as they do to the time of naturalization in the other. Persons not thus subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at the time of birth cannot become so afterwards except by being naturalized..." (emphasis added)

And also held that "the children of subjects of any foreign government" born within the United States are not citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment because they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States. 

I agree with the opinion that people not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States at birth can only become citizens afterwards via naturalization. However, one must obviously note that the quote says nothing about requiring parents to be citizens in order to be born a citizen.

Elk v. Wilkins said that Native Americans living on tribal land were not subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and therefore did not gain birthright citizenship (the later Indian Citizenship Act granted them birthright citizenship). I agree with the decision, as it aligns quite nicely with the discussion of the Citizenship Clause in congress, and how Native American tribal land, at least at the time, was not under the jurisdiction of the United States. An argument can be made that the Major Crimes Act, which said certain crimes committed in Native American territory could be prosecuted by the federal government, did bring them under their jurisdiction and thus should have granted them birthright citizenship... but that law was passed the year after Elk v. Wilkins.

The lawsuit also claims that it "held that "children of subjects of any foreign government" born within the United States are not citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment." Let's see how that quoted phrase actually was used, with the portion quoted underlined::

"Indians born within the territorial limits of the United States, members of and owing immediate allegiance to one of the Indiana tribes (an alien though dependent power), although in a geographical sense born in the United States, are no more "born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," within the meaning of the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment, than the children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government, or the children born within the United States of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations."

Notice how misrepresented this was. This says that children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government are not US citizens. The statement of "children born within the United States" not being citizens was only in reference to children of ambassadors or other public ministers of foreign nations. Contrary to what the lawsuit claims, this decision did not say that children of subjects of any foreign government were not citizens... it didn't say anything at all about them. It simply said that children of subjects of foreign government born within the domain of that government are not US citizens, and that children of ambassadors and public ministers of foreign nations, even if born in the US, are not US citizens.

I would like to think that they were not being intentionally dishonest with this claim. But if they were not, it means they have done a very poor job reading the paragraph of which their quotation comes from. Or perhaps they simply copied this claim from someone else without bothering to look at the actual opinion to verify it. Either way, they messed up pretty badly.

The lawsuit makes no new arguments after this and simply asserts its conclusions based on the arguments it previously gave. But as should be obvious at this point, those arguments are extremely lacking and make major errors and misrepresentations. It is so badly put together with such blatant errors that quite frankly I wonder if they even meant this as a serious lawsuit or whether the whole purpose of this was just as a publicity stunt of some sort. If so, I suppose it worked, as I never would've heard of the Constitution Association if not for this. But it is extremely weak as a serious constitutional argument. One would certainly expect more from a group called the "Constitution Association" and where one of the plaintiffs (Douglas Gibbs) calls himself "Mr. Constitution."

EXAMINATION OF THE NFRA'S PLATFORM

So much for the Constitution Association's claims. But now that we have seen those arguments, I turn towards the National Federation of Republican Assemblies and their platform (apparently adopted in October of 2023). This section will be significantly shorter, as most of the important things have already been discussed.

The platform is in a Google Doc and the relevant portion on pages 37-38. Since Google Docs can be changed at any time by their owner, it means one cannot have an "archive" of it in the same way they can a web page. In case it is deleted or edited, here is what it says, with my emphases added:

WHEREAS: The Constitutional qualifications of Presidential eligibility, as written in Article II, Section 1, Paragraph 5. state: "No person except a natural born Citizen, shall be eligible, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President;"

WHEREAS: An originalist and strict constructionist understanding of the Constitution in the Scalia and Thomas tradition, as well as precedent-setting U.S. Supreme Court cases below, have found that a "Natural Born Citizen" is defined as a person born on American soil of parents who are both citizens of the United States at the time of the child's birth:

Venus - 12 US 8 Cranch 253 253 (1814)
Shanks v DuPont - 28 US 3 Pet. 242 242 (1830)
Dred Scott v Sandford - 60 US 393 (1857)
Minor v Happersett - 88 US 162 (1875)
United States v Wong Kim Ark - 169 US 649 (1898)
Perkins v Elg - 307 US 325 (1939)

WHEREAS: Several states, candidates, and major political parties have ignored this fundamental Presidential qualification, including candidates Nikki Haley, Vivek Ramaswamy, and Kamala Harris whose parents were not American citizens at the time of their birth.

WHEREAS: Ignoring Presidential qualifications undermines the foundation of Constitutional legality for governance and security for the United States by allowing unqualified candidates to run in Primary State contests.

WHEREAS: In many states, the state Republican Parties decide which presidential candidates are allowed on the ballot for the 2024 Georgia Republican presidential primary

RESOLVED, it is the will of this convention that only candidates who meet the natural born-citizenship standard, interpreted through an originalist and strict constructionist standard, be placed on the 2024 Republican presidential primary ballots.

RESOLVED, this convention urges all members of the National Federation of Republican Assemblies and its state affiliates to use all their influence within their states, to enact the previous resolve. 

The arguments are rather terse, doing nothing but claiming (without providing evidence) that an "originalist" understanding of the Constitution has "found that a "Natural Born Citizen" is defined as a person born on American soil of parents who are both citizens of the United States at the time of the child's birth" and citing some decisions that supposedly also find this... even though, as we have seen, those decisions don't actually say that (we've discussed all but Perkins v. Elg, which I will get to shortly). Now, a platform is obviously not the case to launch into a complex legal argument, but one would think they would have at least give some kind of explanation or brief quote from them.

At any rate, the decisions above are, except for Perkins v. Elg, all cited by the lawsuit, so most likely the NFRA was following the same ideas the lawsuit did (perhaps not the lawsuit itself, but similar sources).

Now, the platform mostly got attention due to its invocation of Dred Scott v. Sandford, a decision nowadays almost universally discredited and considered one of the worst decisions of the Supreme Court in history. Even if someone thinks the awfulness has been exaggerated, it at any rate is regarded as a very bad decision that has little precedential value, particularly given that (even if it was decided correctly) the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendment rendered it largely moot. To cite such a case as your evidence is a very odd choice. But what strikes me as far more odd is the mention of United States v. Wong Kim Ark, which for reasons discussed previously is one of the strongest precedents against the claim that a natural-born citizen is defined as a person born on American soil of parents who are both citizens of the United States at the time of the child's birth.

Venus, Shanks, Dred Scott, Minor, and Wong Kim Ark have all been discussed already and there is little need to repeat the analyses. There is one decision there not in the lawsuit, however, which is Perkins v. Elg. Unlike the lawsuit, nothing at all is cited outside of the case, so it is not clear where it is getting this idea from. There is only one mention of the phrase natural born citizen, which is:

"The court below, properly recognizing the existence of an actual controversy with the defendants (Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U. S. 227), declared Miss Elg "to be a natural born citizen of the United States," and we think that the decree should include the Secretary of State as well as the other defendants."

This is in reference to the lower court, but is clearly saying so with approval. So it is saying she was a natural born citizen, and this is the only time the phrase is used. But this actually contradicts the claim the platform (and lawsuit) is making, that both parents have to be citizens. This is because it appears that only her father was a citizen, as stated here:

"The question is whether the plaintiff, Marie Elizabeth Elg, who was born in the United States of Swedish parents then naturalized here, has lost her citizenship and is subject to deportation because of her removal during minority to Sweden, it appearing that her parents resumed their citizenship in that country but that she returned here on attaining majority with intention to remain and to maintain her citizenship in the United States.
Miss Elg was born in Brooklyn, New York, on October 2, 1907. Her parents, who were natives of Sweden, emigrated to the United States sometime prior to 1906 and her father was naturalized here in that year. In 1911, her mother took her to Sweden where she continued to reside until September 7, 1929. Her father went to Sweden in 1922 and has not since returned to the United States. In November, 1934, he made a statement before an American consul in Sweden that he had voluntarily expatriated himself for the reason that he did not desire to retain the status of an American citizen and wished to preserve his allegiance to Sweden."

This affirms her father was a citizen at the time of her birth, but gives no indication that her mother was. So already this case appears to actually go against the NFRA platform's claim that you need both citizens to be parents, as the decision describes her as a natural born citizen even though only one parent was. It certainly does not provide any evidence for its claim that one requires both parents to be citizens.

So citing this decision as evidence for their claim seems ridiculous. The only thing it says about natural born citizens is that she is one, and if she is one, then the idea that you need both parents to be citizens is flatly wrong.

One additional point should be made. The platform makes the claim that "An originalist and strict constructionist understanding of the Constitution in the Scalia and Thomas tradition" says that a natural born citizen requires two citizen parents. To my knowledge, Clarence Thomas has never referred to himself as a strict constructionist, and Antonin Scalia actually rejected the label. As he states on page 23 of "A Matter of Interpretation", with my emphasis added:

"Textualism should not be confused with so-called strict constructionism, a degraded form of textualism that brings the whole philosophy into disrepute. I am not a strict constructionist, and no one ought to be–though better that, I suppose, than a nontextualist. A text should not be construed strictly, and it should not be construed leniently; it should be construed reasonably, to contain all that it fairly means."

Both certainly consider themselves to be originalists, but the fact it uses "strict constructionist" to describe Scalia when he rejected this indicates that the writers of the platform are just throwing out buzzwords without understanding of their meaning. This is backed up by the fact the platform blithely threw out Dred Scott as evidence and cited cases that explicitly go against the claim they are making. The whole thing, most likely, was just them using some buzzwords they saw somewhere without actually knowing what they were talking about.

CONCLUSION

As I think has been demonstrated, both the platform of the NFRA and the lawsuit by the Constitution Association seem very incompetent in regards to the issues. Quite frankly, the platform's invocation of Dred Scott (although what got it so much criticism) is not even the largest problem in it; it is certainly not as large as it citing cases that actually go directly against its claims, or calling Scalia a strict constructionist when he explicitly disclaimed the term.

Of course, this was a very lengthy post, and perhaps not everyone has the time to read through all of it. I therefore will give a summary of some of the major errors one finds in the lawsuit.

-The lawsuit quotes Robert Natelson as saying that natural born citizen comes from natural born subject. The lawsuit omits mentioning that Natelson, immediately after the statement quoted, gives a definition of natural born subject that goes completely against what the lawsuit claims.
-The lawsuit claims that the term natural born subject comes from Emer Vattel, and that Vattel was indeed the one who came up with the phrase... even though the phrase was not found in the original French and the first English translation to use it came a decade after the Constitution was written. This one error, in fact, destroys most of the arguments the lawsuit makes.
-The lawsuit cites United States v. Wong Kim Ark of all things as evidence for its position, despite the fact that Wong Kim Ark explicitly disagrees with the lawsuit.
-The lawsuit cites Elk v. Wilkins as saying "the children of subjects of any foreign government" are not born citizens under the Fourteenth Amendment, keeping from the reader the fact the full statement is "children of subjects of any foreign government born within the domain of that government" (that is, outside of the United States!) By withholding this portion of the sentence, the lawsuit gives an inaccurate impression of what it said.

There are far more errors, some arguably more detrimental to their case, but I wanted to highlight the ones that most clearly show the lawsuit is of little worth because they are so easily avoided; unlike various other errors, it does not require additional research to discover the problems and instead requires only looking at the very sources they cite. In some of these, it is not clear if the error was due to dishonesty or due to incompetence, but in either case, why should someone take them seriously if they make these kinds of errors?

The NFRA platform dodges some of these errors, although of course it's far shorter. Nevertheless, it does cite Wong Kim Ark despite it being such a strong precedent against their claim, declares we should follow in the "strict constructionist" understanding of the Constitution in the "Scalia tradition" (Scalia said no one should be a strict constructionist), and adds in a new error by citing Perkins v. Elg despite it explicitly saying someone was a natural born citizen despite them apparently having only one parent who was a citizen.

While it is clear that both the lawsuit and the platform are lacking merits, the lawsuit is worthy of more criticism. The platform's issue, at least, seems to have been thrown together by people relying more on buzzwords than substance, and it was by an organization that isn't claiming to specifically be about educating people on the Constitution. 

Meanwhile, the lawsuit, done by an organization that claims to "enable the people through education to understand and help defend the Constitution of the United States", clearly had actual effort put into it (with a lawyer from the Constitution Association involved), which makes its major flaws more incomprehensible. This wasn't a small part of a larger platform that was likely slapped together and not looked at much; this was something specifically arguing this claim. And it was made by people who claim to be educators on the Constitution, one of them being a lawyer. Thus the result is far more embarrassing.

In conclusion? If someone wants to learn about interpreting the Constitution, you certainly shouldn't be looking to the Constitution Association... at least until they, at a minimum, reveal the secrets of time travel they know about that allowed the writers of the Constitution in the year 1787 to make use of a 1797 translation.

0 Links